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SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH CNDP REPRESENTATIVES

REF: KINSHASA 665

¶1. (SBU) Summary: USAID Goma officer held a private meeting with CNDP representatives Rene Abandi and Bertrand Bisimwa at their request August 13. USAID officer stressed that the CNDP should take meaningful action to demonstrate that they are not completely out of the Amani process. The CNDP representatives responded positively to the suggestions proffered by USAID officer, and also stated that the CNDP military wing had been instructed not to be the ones who initiate any hostilities. Abandi said that one of the reasons why Nkunda has been less visible of late is that he is studying English.
End summary.

¶2. (SBU) USAID Goma officer held a private meeting with CNDP representatives Rene Abandi and Bertrand Bisimwa at their request August 13, following up a meeting held between the International Facilitation and the two CNDP representatives on August 11 (reftel). Abandi and Bisimwa asked USAID officer what steps the CNDP should take at this point in the process.

¶3. (SBU) USAID officer stressed that the CNDP should take meaningful action to demonstrate that they are not completely out of the Amani process. The CNDP must take the initiative, or at least be proactive in trying to stimulate forward progress. Potential actions that the CNDP could take or be involved in include:

- Full CNDP demilitarization and evacuation from Kimoka
- Nkunda's participation in a meeting at Kimoka with PARECO representatives and FARDC General Mayala
- Non-disarmed disengagement on a large scale along with PARECO and the FARDC.

¶4. (SBU) Abandi responded that the CNDP could probably deliver on demilitarization and evacuation from Kimoka and that they could seriously look at the ideas of a meeting at Kimoka and non-disarmed disengagement. USAID officer stressed that the latter two ideas are actions that could only be carried out if everyone within the Amani process wanted to move down those tracks, which is not a foregone conclusion. Abandi and Bisimwa also stated that the CNDP military wing had been instructed not to be the ones who initiate any hostilities.

¶5. (SBU) The CNDP representatives asked if it is realistic to look at the possibility of a meeting between Nkunda and a high-level GDRC official in a third country. USAID officer responded that, while theoretically possible, it would be a long shot (Note: It is doubtful that either the GDRC or the Facilitation would want to do this. End note).

¶6. (SBU) Abandi said that one of the reasons why Nkunda has been less visible of late is that he is studying English; both Abandi and Bisimwa as well are scheduled to go to Kenya to study English. Separately, both remarked that poor governance is increasingly the norm in the DRC. Bisimwa said that perhaps what was needed was for the CNDP to govern a few cities and demonstrate how to do things.

(Note: Abandi disassociated himself from what he termed Bisimwa's "conclusions." End note).

¶7. (SBU) Comment: Bisimwa's and Abandi's willingness to seek out and consider ways to move the Amani process forward represents the first positive sign out of the CNDP in quite some time, in spite of the disturbing idea about how the CNDP should govern a few cities. Still, it will require concrete action on the part of the CNDP to demonstrate that they are serious about the peace process. End comment.

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